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NSC BRIEFING

18 June 1958

CYPRUS

- I. Situation on island tense, but relatively quiet since 13 June.
 - A. 16 killed and over 200 injured week of 7-13 June.
 - B. British maintaining peace with curfews and barricades.
 - C. Violence likely following announcement new British plan as it does not accept either Greek demand for self-determination or Turk demand for partition.
 - D. New Turk attacks on Greek Cypriots could result in retaliation by EOKA which has taken no known part in recent communal clashes.
 - E. Greek and Turk Cypriots continue move from areas where they are in minority to areas where they predominate.
- II. British now plan to announce new proposals on 19 June. Plan already rejected by Turkey and may be rejected by Greece.
 - A. Announcement postponed from 17 June at request of US and NATO Secretary General to encourage countries concerned to negotiate further. Discussion between Greeks and Turks in MAC has been relatively mild.

B.

Failure new plan and continued British casualties on Cyprus would cause strong public pressure on London withdraw from island--at least back to base enclaves.

- III. Greece faces political crisis over Cyprus.

- A. Opposition parties and press denounce govt for failure take Cyprus issue to Security Council. Appeal to NATO regarded as "useless." Issue has been exploited by communists and other anti-Western elements in Greece.

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III. Rightist activities give the French Communists a fresh opportunity to pose as champions of the republic, but they are handicapped by fear of alienating non-Communist elements who might enter Popular Front government, and by widespread apathy of rank and file.

A. In addition the USSR continues to take a cautious attitude toward De Gaulle publicly in order not to prejudice its future diplomatic relations with him.

IV. Regarding relations with the West, De Gaulle has again stated some of his views through Mollet.

A. France will honor her commitments to Euratom, Common Market, etc.

B. He considers the French should play a stronger role in NATO.